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CASE COMMENTS

While Crisci recognizes that it is always in the insured's interest to settle
within the policy limits whenever there is a possibility of an excess judgment,
its strict liability approach fails to balance the insured's interest in low rates
against his interest in complete coverage. 45 Florida's direct action approach,
on the other hand, preserves the insurer's right to reject apparently unworthy
claims and protects policyholders from the higher rates likely to result from
a strict liability standard. The instant decision, without abandoning the
fault concept, ensures greater parity between the interests of both insurance
companies and the public. Although the decision fails to justify its damage
theory,46 it adequately accomplishes a goal long sought by courts and legisla4
tures: fast payment of deserving claims by responsive insurance companies. Y
LARRY L. TEPLY

WRONGFUL DEATH: JUDICIAL ACTION IN THE FACE OF
LEGISLATIVE INACTION
Garnerv. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971)
Decedent's widow filed an action for damages pursuant to Florida's
Wrongful Death Statute.1 Petitioner, decedent's first wife, sought to intervene individually and on behalf of the children of decedent's first marriage
who had remained dependent upon him. The trial court denied intervention,
and the district court of appeal affirmed.2 On certiorari,3 the Supreme Court
of Florida reversed and HELD, in cases involving broken families or stepfamilies, all persons who suffer loss as the result of a wrongful death, "and
who are entitled to recover," may join in a wrongful death action as proper
parties.,
45. Lipsig, supra note 6, at 2.
46. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
47. The trend toward no fault insurance reflects the same underlying philosophy -lower
cost through fast, efficient handling of claims. See generally L. GREEN, TRAFFic ViCTIMs:
ToRT LAw AND INSURANCE (1958).
1. FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1969) provides in part that whenever the death of a person shall
be caused by the wrongful act of an individual and the act would have entitled the injured
party to maintain an action if death had not ensued, then the person who would have
been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for damages. FLA. STAT.
§768.02 (1969) vests the cause of action in a hierarchy of named beneficiaries: (1) the
surviving spouse; (2) decedent's minor children; (8) other persons dependent upon the
decedent; and (4) the executor or administrator of decedent's estate.
2. 237 So. 2d 25 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1970) (per curiam).
3. Petitioner's writ of certiorari was based on conflict jurisdiction. FLA. CONsr. art. V,
§4(2). Conflict was alleged between the lower court's holding and the holding in Powell
v. Gessner, 231 So. 2d 50 (4th D.CA. Fla.), writ discharged, 238 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1970).
4. 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971) (unanimous decision).
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At common law, recovery was denied where death resulted from the
negligence or wrongful act of another, 5 but no satisfactory reason for this

7
rule was suggested.6 Nevertheless, the rule was accepted by American courts

and recognized as part of the common law of Florida.8 The ironic result was
that it was cheaper for a defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him. 9
England remedied the injustice inherent in the common law rule in
1846, by the passage of Lord Campbell's Act, 10 which authorized the personal
representative to bring suit for the decedent's wrongful death." The beneficiaries of the suit were the decedent's spouse, parents (including grandparents and step-parents), and children (including grandchildren and stepchildren). 2 Damages were awarded commensurate with the loss suffered by
each family member.

3

Today, every state provides a remedy for wrongful death by statutes
usually patterned after Lord Campbell's Act.' 4 However, many states, including Florida,1 5 do not incorporate the exact language of the original act. 16
These differences have led to divergent judicial authority whether wrongful
death statutes should be accorded strict or liberal constructionY.
Three statutes comprise the Florida counterpart of Lord Campbell's Act.' s
Section 768.01 creates a cause of action where the death of a person is caused
by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another." Section 768.02 vests the
cause of action in four classes of beneficiaries in descending order of priority:
(1) the surviving spouse; (2) decedent's minor children; (3) persons dependent upon the decedent; and (4) the executor or administrator of the
5. E.g., Florida Cent. & Pac. R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 70, 25 So. 338, 346 (1899). The
origin of this rule has been attributed to the early English case of Higgins v. Butcher, 80
Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1606) See Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, Ill Fla. 278, 284, 149
So. 631, 632-33 (1933). Other authority attributes the rule to dictum in Baker v. Bolton,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808). S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONCFUL DEATH §1:1 (1966).
6. S. SPEIsm, supra note 5, §1:4.
7. Id. §1:3.
8. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, I11 Fla. 278, 284-85, 149 So. 631, 633 (1933).
9. W. Prosser, Torts §127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§1-5 (1846). The Act was entitled: "An Act for Compensating
the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents." (Emphasis added.)
11. Id. §2.

12. Id. §§2, 5.
13. Id. §2.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 9.
15. Fla. Stat. §§768.01-.03 (1969).
16. Alpert, The Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 153, 156 (1957), See S. SPEISER,
supra note 5, app. A.
17. S. SPEISER, supra note 5, §§1:8, 1:10. Compare Jones v. Pledger, 363 F.2d 986
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (liberal construction), with McGinty v. Ballentine Produce Inc., 241 Ark.
533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966) (strict construction). In Florida, compare Haddock ex rel.
Wiggins v. Florida Motor Lines Corp., 150 Fla. 848, 9 So. 2d 98 (1942) and Powell v.
Gessner, 231 So. 2d 50 (4th D.C.A. Fla.), writ discharged, 238 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1970) (liberal
construction), with Holland v. Hall, 145 So. 2d 552 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962) and Randolph
v. Clack, 113 So. 2d 270 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (strict construction).
18. FLA. STAT. §§768.01-.03 (1969).
19.

FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1969).
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decedent's estate.20 Section 768.03 permits the father or, if he is deceased, the
21
mother to recover for pain and suffering and the loss of the minor's services.
The jury is authorized to award such damages as the party entitled to sue
22
may have sustained from the wrongful death.
The essential difference between the Florida statutes and Lord Campbell's Act is the party designated to recover. Florida limits recovery to one
of four restricted classes of beneficiaries, 3 including recovery by the personal
representative for the benefit of the decedent's estate. 24 The existence of a
higher class of statutory beneficiaries bars all other classes from a right of
action or participation 2 5 even though the higher class does not prosecute the
action.26 Lord Campbell's Act, however, had no class priority and permitted
all named beneficiaries to recover through an action by the decedent's
27
personal representative.
Florida's departure from the provisions of Lord Campbell's Act has led
to harsh results and judicial requests for legislative action.28 In Holland v.
Hall,29 for example, three children of the decedent mother's previous marriage were denied damages for wrongful death sought on their behalf by
their stepfather. Even though the decedent had supported the children, recovery was denied because the statutory cause of action vested solely in the
stepfather who could sue only for his own damages. The court noted the
consequent hardship to the dependent children, but observed that the sole
remedy for such situations was statutory amendment. 30
Despite the general tendency to strictly construe the wrongful death
statute,31 some courts have regarded the statute as remedial and subject to
20. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1969).
21. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1969). Sections 768.01 and 768.02 were initially enacted in 1883
and have not been significantly amended. Fla. Laws 1883, ch. 3439, §§1-2, at 59; Alpert,
supra note 16, at 156. The original omission of parental recovery for the wrongful death
of a minor was remedied by Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4722, §1, at 114-15, now FLA. STAT. §768.03
(1969).
22. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1969).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Florida Cent. & Pac. R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 70, 25 So. 338, 347 (1899). See
Fussell v. Douberly, 206 So. 2d 231 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968), where decedent's minor children
were prohibited from maintaining an action or claiming any right, title, or interest in the
surviving spouse's judgment.
26. Benoit v. Miami Beach Elec. Co., 85 Fla. 396, 96 So. 158 (1923) (survival of nonprosecuting dependent mother bars action by decedent's administratrix).
27. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§1-5 (1846).
28. E.g., Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Fussell v. Douberly, 206 So. 2d
231 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Strickland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 194 So. 2d 69 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1967).
29. 145 So. 2d 552 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
30. The court also held that the stepfather had no legal duty to support the children
of decedent's prior marriage, and that the statutory designation of the class in whom the
cause of action shall vest must be strictly construed because it was in derogation of the
common law.
31. Statutes in derogation of the common law are generally construed strictly. E.g.,
Strickland v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 194 So., 2d 69, 70 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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a liberal construction, which effectuates legislative intent.32 In Powell v. Gessner 3 the decedent was survived by a dependent parent and by a minor child
who had been adopted by relatives. Both brought an action for wrongful
death. The court declined to apply the literal language of the statute, which
vested the cause of action solely in the child 34 and allowed only the dependent
parent the cause of action. Reasoning that the legislature did not intend for
a child to recover after being removed from the parent-child relationship, 35
the court held that adoption terminated the child's right to damages. 36
The instant decision represents a new direction in the Florida supreme
court's construction of the wrongful death statute.3 7 In allowing joinder of
parties the court receded from the line of cases that applied a strict construction of the statute in these situations. 38 The court thereby expanded the
prior but infrequent cases construing and applying the statute remedially.
The court's rationale in the instant case centered on a collective interpretation of the wrongful death statutes.3 9 Based upon such an interpretation, the court concluded the statutes were capable of more than one construction when applied either to broken families or to stepfamilies. Under
rules of statutory construction, the wrongful death statute should thus be
construed to implement its purpose, even if such construction did not strictly
apply the statutory language. The court stated: "The existence of priorities
ordered on family relationships or dependency presupposes the existence of
such relationships." 40 Therefore, the court reasoned the legislature did not
intend class priorities to govern where family relationships were destroyed
by adoption or divorce or where steprelationships had been created. 4 '
Despite the desirable result, the court's view of legislative intent may be
an overstatement. The wrongful death statute has been termed an obvious
result of legislative compromise. 42 Some legislators feared the courts would
4
be deluged with wrongful death actions resulting in excessive damages. 3
Others thought, however, that even Lord Campbell's Act unduly limited the
classes of parties allowed to recover. 44 Moreover, an earlier decision of the
Florida supreme court 45 described the purpose of the wrongful death statutes
as that of fixing liability and determining damages, not the compensation of

32.

E.g., Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921); Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15

So. 876 (1894); Guarniere v. Henderson, 171 So. 2d 617 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
33. 231 So. 2d 50 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1970).
34. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1969).
35. 231 So. 2d at 53.
36. Id. at 50.
37. See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955).
38. 251 So. 2d at 257.
39. Id. at 256.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42.
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24 (1969).

43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Florida Cent. & Pac. R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 71-72, 25 So. 338, 347 (1899).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss3/12

4

1972]

Barner: Wrongful Death: Judicial Action in the Face of Legislative Action
CASE COMMENTS

families. That court observed the Florida statute, unlike Lord Campbell's
Act, imposes liability whether or not there is a family or dependents to compensate, since the statute vests a right of action in the decedent's executor or
4
administrator when no other class of beneficiaries survives. 6
The instant court fortified its argument of probable legislative intent
by citing the constitutional mandate that the courts shall be open to all persons for the remedy of any injury.7 It should be noted, however, that this
constitutional provision does not mean that either a statute or the common
law must provide a remedy for every injury to an individual. 4s The word
"injury" implies the invasion of a legal right.4 9 Because there was no right
to recover for wrongful death at common law,5 0 a petitioner would seem to
have no statutory remedy unless the wrongful death statute explicitly provides one. Therefore, the court's contention of an undeniable constitutional
right appears circuitous at best. 51
Despite possible criticism of the court's rationale, the instant decision
provides much needed relief for members of either broken families or stepfamilies suffering loss from wrongful death. Nevertheless, the court's limitation of the decision to such parties appears to limit its effect. The explicit
statutory hierarchy of beneficiaries5 2 remains an obstacle to more expansive
remedial interpretations of the wrongful death statute. Except in broken
family or stepfamily situations, neither children nor others dependent upon the
decedent will be allowed to recover where a spouse survives. 53 Nor will any
class of beneficiaries have a cause of action if a higher class chooses not to
sue54
Judicial pleas to eliminate these statutory inequities have gone unheeded
by the Florida Legislature. 5 Affirmative and far-reaching corrective legisla-

46. Id. See Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755 (1908).

47. 251 So. 2d at 257. See FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §21.
48. See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 214, 20 So. 2d 243, 250 (1944).

49. Id.
50. See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
51. But see Haddock ex rel Wiggins v. Florida Motor Lines Corp., 150 Fla. 848, 9 So. 2d
98 (1942).
52. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1969).
53. Id.
54. See Benoit v. Miami Beach Elec. Co., 85 Fla. 396, 96 So. 158 (1923). See also
Jacksonville Elec. Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755 (1908). The negligent party remains

possibly liable for more damages if the decedent leaves no family or other dependents and
the action is maintained by the executor or administrator of decedent's estate. An administrator may recover the pecuniary value at decedents death of his prospective earnings and
savings, while a spouse, minor children, or dependents may recover only the damages they
sustained as a result of the wrongful death. Id. at 757.

55. In 1957 a bill to eliminate inequities by reordering the hierarchy of beneficiaries
in whom the cause of action vests was killed in committee. Alpert, supra note 16, at 180.
In 1969 the Florida Law Revision Commission proposed legislation allowing, in one civil
action, full recovery by decedent's relatives sustaining a loss of support and services. FLA.
LAW REVISION COMe'N, supra note 42, at 9-12. No legislation has been enacted to date.
See Powers, The Wrongful Death Mess in Florida, 45 FLA. B.J. 634 (1971).
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tion is needed. As one writer has said: "The truly appalling situation in
Florida arising out of our death act cannot be overemphasized. The grief,
misery and travail, loss and destitution, are unnecessary. The Death Acts
must be changed."' 56 The time is overdue for this plea to be answered.
FREEMAN

W.

BARNER, JR.

56.

Alpert, supra note 16, at 182.
NoTE: A recent comprehensive revision of the Florida Wrongful Death Act,
effective July 1, 1972, provides in part that the decedent's personal representative shall
recover, in a single action, for the benefit of decedent's survivors and estate, all damages
caused by the injury resulting in death. "Survivors" includes spouse, minor children, and
parents. Recovery by other persons dependent upon the decedent for support is limited
to blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 72-35, §1.
EDITOR'S
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